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Abstract  
We present a model of political competition in which an incumbent politician, 
may implement a costly policy to prevent a possible threat to, for example, 
national security or a natural disaster. The incumbent is privately informed 
about her level of competence. After the policy is implemented, it may be 
unknown whether or not it was required. We show that, in these circumstances, 
a competent incumbent only takes advantage of her private information about 
the likelihood of disaster when voting is based solely on the policy’s outcome 
and not on the incumbent’s competence. Our result is consistent with and may 
help explain voters’ behavior observed after natural disasters.  
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1. Introduction 
We consider an incumbent politician whose country faces the threat of a 
possible natural disaster. If no action is taken, the disaster will occur with some 
imperfectly known probability. Alternatively, the incumbent may take 
appropriate measures to avert the disaster. But both action and inaction pose 
risks for her prospect of reelection. She will not be reelected if disaster strikes. 
But voters may also punish her if actions are taken which voters subsequently 
judge to have been unnecessary and wasteful.    
As an example, consider the California wildfires of 2019. After 
widespread outcry, the public demanded to know why controlled burns were 
insufficiently used as a preventative measure. Miller et al. (2020) studied this 
issue and found that lack of aggressive controlled burns in the fire-plagued 
state was cost-related: labor and equipment and potential for damaged 
property. Now, greater consensus has emerged that adopting the more 
aggressive (and costly) controlled burns approach is required. However, this 
leaves open the potential future criticism that if wildfires do not re-occur such 
a policy may be claimed to be too aggressive and unnecessarily expensive.  
We develop a model to study this issue when the incumbent  may be 
competent – meaning that she is better informed (or is able to take steps to 
become better informed) than the average voter about the appropriate policy 
choice, or incompetent – meaning that she is no better informed than the 
average voter. The incumbent is privately informed of her type but voters are 
not.  We analyze equilibrium outcomes for two types of voters. Backward 
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looking voters vote only on the basis of the chosen policy’s outcome without 
considering what it may reveal about the incumbent ’s competence – which is 
relevant for her response to future events. Forward looking voters, by contrast, 
are more forward looking - they vote not only on the basis of past outcomes but 
also on what the chosen policy reveals about the incumbent’s level of 
competence. We show that in equilibrium, the incumbent adopts a better policy 
- i.e. one which is more aligned with voters’ interests - when voters are 
backward looking than when they are forward looking. In particular, when 
voters are backward looking, the competent incumbent ’s choice of policy is 
guided by her superior private information. When voters are forward looking, 
by contrast, the competent incumbent ’s policy ignores her private information. 
Thus our analysis suggests that backward looking behavior of voters after 
natural disaster (e.g. floods, wildfires, virus outbreak etc.) may lead to better 
policy choices.  
Voter and incumbent behavior in the context of natural disasters has 
been studied empirically. In particular, Healy and Malhotra (2009) showed that 
voters reward the incumbent presidential party for delivering disaster relief 
spending, but not for investing in disaster preparedness spending. Gasper and 
Reeves (2011) showed that voters punish politicians after severe weather 
damage. Achen and Bartels (2004) found that voters regularly punish 
governments for droughts, floods, and shark attacks. Malhotra and Kuo (2008) 
designed a survey experiment to discover which public official citizens blamed 
after Hurricane Katarina and concluded that although voters are not objective 
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processors of information as envisioned by Kramer (1971), they are also not 
myopic. Wolfers (2002), who considered voters to be rational only if they 
distinguish between lucky and competent incumbents, showed that voters vote 
for incumbents after national booms, dumping them after national recessions. 
Those studies suggest that voter behavior tends to be backward looking and 
our analysis suggests that when facing a collective threat such backward 
looking voter behavior may be beneficial. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the remainder of this 
section, we present a survey of the literature. In section 2, we describe the 
model. Sections 3 characterizes equilibria in the case the voter is backward 
looking and section 4 characterizes equilibria in the case the voter is forward 
looking. Welfare consequences are analyzed in section 5. In section 6 we discuss 
voter with different preferences than the ones assumed in the model. Section 7 
conclude. 
Related Literature  
Our analysis is closely related to the literature about the effect of imperfect 
voter rationality on politicians’ behavior. Several studies have shown 
that Bayesian failures or cognitive biases of voters can be beneficial. For 
instance, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2014) shows that behavioral biases 
might be beneficial for voters when considering strategic politicians, Levy and 
Razin (2015) demonstrate that voters who have a "correlation neglect" cognitive 
bias improves political outcomes, while Millner et al. (2020) show that it can be 
beneficial when voters have "confirmation bias". By contrast, in our model 
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voters always “correctly” (using Bayes rule) process all available information. 
Our analysis therefore can be viewed as complementary to these papers by 
showing that backward looking Bayesian voters may lead to better policy 
outcomes. 
 We are also related to the herding literature, in which decision makers 
ignore their private information. The most closely related paper in this vein is 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990). They consider a model with two reputation-
oriented ex-ante identical managers, each of whom who may be “smart” or 
“dumb”. Each manager receives a private informative signal about the 
profitability of an investment opportunity and make sequential investment 
choices. They show that when smart managers’ signals are more correlated 
than those of dumb managers, the second investor ignores her private signal 
and mimics the first investor’s behavior, who, in contrast, always follows her 
own private signal. The reason is that as smart investors' signals are more 
correlated than those of dumb investors, mimicking the first investor implies 
that they received identical signals, which increases the probability that the 
second investor is smart. Thus in their model, a single decision maker (or the 
first one) always acts on her private information. By contrast, in our model 
there is a single decision maker who ignores her private signal in equilibrium.1 
 
1 Another important difference is that Scharfstein and Stein (1990) assume that, ex-poste there 
is complete information on the state of the world, while ex-poste incomplete information on 
the state of the world is a key property of our model.  
 
6 
 
Our research is also related to the literature on government accountability 
that studies how the desire of politicians to be reelected affects policy choices 
(see, Maskin and Tirole, 2004; Battaglini and Harstad, 2020; Herrera et al. 2020), 
and to the literature on politician quality that mainly tries to answer two 
primary questions: 1) Who becomes a politician? (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Dal 
Bo et al., 2017) and 2) Where are the best politicians located? (Galasso and 
Nannicini, 2011). In particular, Caselli and Morelli (2004) showed that less 
qualified citizens become politicians due to comparative advantage. Our result 
suggests that, qualified politicians choose better policies when voters are 
willing to vote for unqualified ones.2  
 
2. The model 
An incumbent faces the threat of a natural disaster to his constituency. 
Specifically, there are two possible states of the word, denoted S.  If S=B (bad) 
the disaster will strike unless the incumbent acts by taking appropriate, and 
costly, measures to prevent it.  If S=G the disaster will not occur.  S=B with 
probability p' and S=G with probability 1-p', where p' is a random variable with 
a commonly known probability distribution f over the interval [0,1] and mean 
p>0. The incumbent chooses between two policies: either to act – taking costly 
 
2 Cohen and Werker (2008) considered a model of policy choice in the context of natural 
disasters, in which there is a common prior on the state of the world and the government is 
viewed to be a social planner. They show that international aid increases the chance that 
governments will under-invest in natural disaster policy. Note that, in contrast to their model, 
private information is the key property of our model. In particular, we assume that the 
incumbent has private information on the state of the world if she is competent and whether 
or not she is competent is private information as well. 
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measures to prevent the disaster – or not to act. We denote the incumbent’s 
policy choice by c, where c=a if she acts and c=na if she doesn’t. The incumbent 
must choose her policy before the actual state is possibly revealed as described 
below.   
The incumbent may be either competent or incompetent. A competent 
incumbent knows the actual p'. An incompetent incumbent only knows the 
average probability p.3 The incumbent is privately informed of her type but 
voters are not; they assign prior probability q that the incumbent is competent. 
Each type of incumbent chooses her policy to maximize the probability of being 
reelected. At the end of the incumbent ’s tenure a single voter decides whether 
to reelect the incumbent or to elect the challenger. 
We assume the voter’s utility is highest if there is no disaster and no action 
is taken, is reduced by the cost of action if action is taken, and is lowest if the 
disaster occurs. In addition we assume that the cost of a is p – that is, the cost of 
prevention is proportional to its likelihood. Then the voter has the following 
utility function: 
(1)   𝑢 = {
1 − 𝑝,                       if 𝑐 = 𝑎
0,        if 𝑐 = 𝑛𝑎 and 𝑆 = 𝐵
1,        if 𝑐 = 𝑛𝑎 and 𝑆 = 𝐺
}. 
 
 
 
 
3 A competent incumbent is able to interpret a private signal revealed to her at the beginning 
of her tenure, while an incompetent incumbent is unable to.   
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The voter’s most preferred policy is the one that maximizes her expected 
utility. (1) implies that voter’s expected utility is maximized when c=a if p’ >p,  
and is maximized when c=na if p’<p. In other words the voter considers the 
expected benefits from a to exceed the cost when the probability for a disaster 
is above average and considers the cost to exceed the expected benefit when it 
is below average. Given the high level of uncertainty involved in natural 
disasters, this assumption seems to be reasonable, at least in some 
circumstances. We refer to a voter with these preferences as action neutral.4  
At the end of the incumbent’s tenure, the voter observes the policy choice 
and whether or not the disaster has taken place. In addition, with exogenous 
probability 1-y, yϵ[0,1] the true state S is publicly revealed before voting takes 
place if the incumbent  has chosen c=a (and with probability y is not revealed). 
For instance, with a probability y a floodgate completely blocks a flood and, 
therefore, ex-post it will be impossible to know whether or not a flood would 
have occurred. However, with probability 1-y, the flood is partly blocked such 
that some harmless amount of water passes the floodgate, providing evidence 
that the floodgate successfully prevented flooding.  
Thus, if c=na, the voter always learns S perfectly (since when c=na disaster is 
averted only if S=G). But if c=a, then S is only perfectly observed with 
probability 1-y. Finally, the voter decides whether to vote for the incumbent or 
a challenger.  
 
4 This may be viewed as the preferences of the median voter, while other voters are either pro-
action or against-action. In section 6 we consider voters with such preferences.  
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The sequence of events is shown below. 
Timeline
 
3. Backward looking voters 
In this section we assume that the incumbent is reelected only if, given the 
available information, her chosen policy is perceived to have maximized 
voter’s expected utility on election day, irrespective of what the policy choice 
might reveal about the incumbent’s competency. We refer to this behavior as 
backward looking.  
Formally, let pel be the probability that S=B at election day. Specifically, pel=0 
if S=G is revealed, pel=1 if S=B is revealed, and pel is given by Bayes rule if S is 
not revealed. Let rbl be the probability that a backward looking voter votes for 
the incumbent after the latter is observed to choose cϵ{a,na}. Then by (1),  
(2) 𝑟𝑏𝑙 =
{
 
 
1, if 𝑐 = 𝑎 and 𝑝𝑒𝑙 > 𝑝 or 𝑐 = 𝑛𝑎 and 𝑝𝑒𝑙 < 𝑝
0, if 𝑐 = 𝑎 and 𝑝𝑒𝑙 < 𝑝 or 𝑐 = 𝑛𝑎 and 𝑝𝑒𝑙 > 𝑝
1/2, if                                                           𝑝𝑒𝑙 = 𝑝 
                                                       }
 
. 
 
 
Nature (confidentially)  
determined S to be G or B 
The incumbent chooses c 
  
S is revealed with probability 1-y (if c=a) 
 
 The voter votes  
(Election day) 
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Equilibrium.  
This is a game of asymmetric information since the incumbent is privately 
informed about her type and the competent incumbent is privately informed 
about p’. Thus an appropriate solution concept is Bayesian equilibrium.  
Denote the (possibly mixed) strategies of the competent and 
incompetent incumbent as πc(p') and πnc respectively, where πc(p') is the 
probability, given p’, that a competent incumbent chooses c=a and πnc  is the 
probability (given p) that the competent incumbent chooses c=a. 
A Bayesian Equilibrium is a strategy profile (πc(p'),πnc) such that (i) for 
each type of incumbent there does not exist a different strategy that increases 
her probability to be reelected  and such that (ii) voters beliefs are consistent 
with Bayes rule whenever it applies. 
Proposition 1 establishes that the equilibrium policy choice by each type 
of incumbent is characterized by a threshold probability – she acts if and only 
if the probability that S=B is above a threshold.  
Proposition 1 Suppose that the voter is backward looking. Then, the Bayesian 
equilibria are as follows:  
a. A competent incumbent chooses a (na) when p'>(1-y)/(2-y) (p'<(1-y)/(2-y)).  
b. An incompetent incumbent chooses a (na) when p>(1-y)/(2-y) (p<(1-y)/(2-y)).  
c. If p'=(1-y)/(2-y) (p=(1-y)/(2-y)), then a competent (an incompetent) incumbent 
choice can be any convex combination of a and na.5 
 
5 Note that in the special case in which y=1 and therefore (y-1)/(y-2)=0, πc(0)<1. 
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All proofs appear in the appendix. Notice that the equilibrium is unique except 
for the knife edge cases p’=(1-y)/(2-y) and p=(1-y)/(2-y). Note that the competent 
incumbent ’s policy depends on her private information about the actual 
probability, p’,  while, the incompetent incumbent  always acts if p is sufficiently 
high and never acts otherwise.   
This result is very intuitive. The incumbent must balance the risk of not 
acting – in which case she won’t be reelected if S=B - against the risk of acting 
when actually S=G – in which case he won’t be elected if S is revealed.  For the 
competent incumbent, the former risk is greater the higher is p’ and for the 
incompetent incumbent, the risk is greater the higher is p. The threshold values 
of p’ and p in the preceding proposition are derived to balance these risks. In 
the proof of the proposition it is also shown that this threshold strategy ensures 
that pel>p if S is not revealed and thus when c=a the incumbent is always 
reelected if S is not revealed.6 
Two extreme cases are of special interest. First, suppose that S is always 
revealed (i.e., y=0 and therefore (1-y)/(2-y)=½). Then, to maximize her chance 
of reelection, the competent incumbent chooses a when p’≥½, and the 
incompetent incumbent does the same when p≥½. At the other extreme, 
suppose that S is never revealed (i.e., y=1 and therefore (1-y)/(2-y)=0). Then, 
 
6Note that pel is greater that p when S is not revealed iff πc(p') is monotonically increasing in 
p’. See Lemma 1 in the appendix for the detailed proof. 
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both type of incumbent s choose a except if p’=0, in which case the competent 
incumbent chooses na with positive probability.7 
 Note that Proposition 1 implies that, by Bayes’ rule, the probability that 
the incumbent is competent conditional on choosing a is smaller than q when 
p>(1-y)/(2-y). This is because, in equilibrium, the incompetent incumbent 
always chooses a while the competent one chooses a with a probability smaller 
than 1. Therefore, if the challenger is also competent with probability q, an 
incumbent who chooses a is expected to be less competent than her challenger 
but nevertheless may be reelected. In the next section, we consider a more 
forward looking voter who will not vote for the incumbent in such a case.  
4. Forward looking voters 
In this section, we consider voters who care not only about the outcome of the 
incumbent ’s policy but also about what the chosen policy reveals about her 
competence. More specifically, she votes for the incumbent only if she believes 
that she is likely to be more competent than the challenger, i.e., only if she 
perceived to be competent with a probability not smaller than q. Such a voter 
wishes to distinguish an incompetent incumbent who got lucky from one who 
chose the correct policy out of competence. This is somewhat consistent with 
the conventional definition of rational voters that requires that voters filter 
ability from luck (for instance, see Wolfers, 2002).   
 
7 Since the competent incumbent knows that S=G when p’=0, and because this strategy ensures 
that pa>p and S is never revealed, she is willing to mix between a and na when p’=0. The 
incumbent is therefore always elected when S is never revealed. 
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Formally, we define forward looking voters as follows. Let qc be the 
probability that the incumbent is competent conditional on choosing c(ϵ{a,na}) 
and let rfl be the probability that a forward looking voter votes for the 
incumbent . Then: rfl=0 if qc<q. If qc≥q, then rfl=rbl, where rbl is given by (2). 
The following proposition presents equilibria when voters are forward 
looking.  
Proposition 2 When voters are forward looking, there are exactly two Bayesian 
equilibria:  either (πc,πnc)=(0,0) for all p' or (πc,πnc)=(1,1) for all p'. 
Thus, in either equilibrium, the competent incumbent 's strategy is independent 
of p' when the voter is forward looking and, therefore, the incumbent 's policy 
choice is not informative.  
The reason for this result is as follows. Suppose to the contrary that the 
incumbent plays a pure strategy and the competent incumbent ’s choice 
depends on p’. Then, since the incompetent incumbent is uninformed about p’, 
she either always chooses c=a or always chooses c=na. Suppose she chooses c=a. 
Then, voters who observe c=a will update beliefs to qc<q. In that case a 
incumbent who chooses a is never elected and therefore neither type of 
incumbent will ever choose a. Similarly, if the incompetent incumbent always 
chooses na. An extension of this argument to show that there is no equilibrium 
in which the incumbent plays a mixed strategy is somewhat more involved and 
appears in the appendix.  
 The next section considers welfare consequences of the voter’s behavior.  
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5. Voter Welfare 
The purpose of this section is to compare the effect of the equilibrium policies 
on the utility of the backward looking and forward looking voter.  
Let Ub be the backward looking voter’s expected equilibrium utility, let uc 
be his expected equilibrium utility if the incumbent is competent and unc his 
expected equilibrium utility if the incumbent is incompetent. Then  
Ub =quc+(1-q)unc.  
By Proposition 1,  
(3) 𝑢𝑐 = ∫ 𝑓(𝑝
′)
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑝′=0
(1 − 𝑝′)𝑑𝑝′ +∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)(1 − 𝑝)𝑑𝑝′
1
𝑝′=
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
 
= 1 − (∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)𝑝′
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑝′=0
𝑑𝑝′ + ∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)𝑝
1
𝑝′=
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑑𝑝′).  
By proposition 1, depending on the value of p, the incompetent incumbent 
either always chooses c=a or always chooses c=na. By (1), in either case the 
voter’s utility is 1-p.  Thus unc=1-p and thus:  
Ub =quc+(1-q)(1-p).  
Let Uf be the expected equilibrium utility of a forward looking voter. By 
proposition 2, when the voter is forward looking both types of incumbent either 
always choose a or always choose na, and again, by (1), the voter’s equilibrium 
utility is 1-p in either case.  Thus, Uf=1-p and thus:  
Ub–Uf =q(uc -(1-p)) where uc is given by (3).   
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Proposition 3:   Ub–Uf >0   
 Proposition 3 therefore establishes that backward looking voter’s equilibrium 
expected utility is higher than that of the forward looking voter.  
6. Voter with different preferences 
The preceding analysis has assumed that the voter is ex-ante action neutral.  In 
this section we examine the extent to which our results generalize when this 
assumption is relaxed. In particular, the voter utility function is now: 
(1’)   𝑢 = {
𝑝/𝑝 − 𝑝,                       if 𝑐 = 𝑎
0,           if 𝑐 = 𝑛𝑎 and 𝑆 = 𝐵
𝑝/𝑝,        if 𝑐 = 𝑛𝑎 and 𝑆 = 𝐺
}, 
where a voter is considered to be pro-action if p<p, against action if p>p, and action 
neutral if p=p (in which case (1’) corresponds to (1).  
Proposition 4  
(i) If the voter is backward looking and pro action, then the incumbent 's 
equilibrium policies are given by Proposition 1  
(ii) If the voter is forward looking, then the incumbent ’s equilibrium policy is 
given by proposition 2 whether the voter is pro action or against action.  
Thus the equilibria are robust to changes in voter preferences when the voter is 
forward looking and when the voter is backward looking and pro action. 
However, this is not necessarily the case when the voter is backward looking 
and against action. Recall that one reason the strategy described in Proposition 
1 is optimal for the incumbent is that it ensures that pel>p and her reelection 
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when S is not revealed. Thus if the voter is pro action (i.e., p>𝑝) the strategy 
also implies a fortiori that pel>p when S is not revealed. By contrast, if the voter 
is against action, (i.e., p<p) it may be that pel<p when S is not revealed and hence 
the threshold policy described in proposition 1 might no longer be optimal. The 
equilibrium policy will then depend on model parameters. We discuss this case 
more fully in Appendix 2. 
Although the equilibrium policies when voters are pro action are 
unchanged, the welfare consequences of those policies may differ from those 
derived above in section 5. Recall that when the voter is action neutral (is 
indifferent between the policies when p’=p), then the incompetent incumbent 
’s policy has the same effect on utility of backward and forward looking voters.  
And similarly, when the voter is action neutral each equilibrium policy given 
by proposition 2 has the same effect on the utility of a forward looking voter. 
By contrast, when voters are not action neutral, they strictly prefer one policy 
over the other when p’=p, and thus the policy choice has welfare consequences 
both when the voter is backward and when she is forward looking. As a result, 
welfare comparison between backward and forward looking voters depends 
on p (as given by the threshold strategy in proposition 1) when voters are 
backward looking and the equilibrium selection when they are forward 
looking.8  
 
8 In addition to the above mentioned effect of voter’s preferences on their equilibrium utility, 
note that the utility of a backward looking voter also depends on his preferences when the 
incumbent is competent. In particular, since (1’) depends on voters’ preferences, (3) does as 
well. 
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7. Conclusion 
We consider a model of political competition in the presence of a threat. We 
solve this model when voters are either backward looking or forward looking 
to show that under certain conditions, competent incumbent s’ choices are less 
distortive when voters are backward looking, consistent with widely observed 
behavior following natural disasters. Our analysis thus suggests that such 
behavior may be beneficial.  
Appendix 1:  Proofs  
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we formally describe the incumbent ’s problem. 
Let ra(ϵ{0,1/2,1}) be the probability that the incumbent  is reelected conditional 
on choosing a in case S is not revealed and 𝐸{𝑟𝑐|𝑝′} and 𝐸𝑟𝑛𝑐 the expected 
probabilities that a competent and incompetent incumbent  are reelected, given 
the information available to them, correspondingly. A competent incumbent 
then solves: 
(4) max
𝜋𝑐
𝐸{𝑟𝑐|𝑝′} 
where 
𝐸{𝑟𝑐|𝑝
′} = 𝜋𝑐(𝑝
′(1 − 𝑦) + 𝑦𝑟𝑎) + (1 − 𝜋𝑐)(1 − 𝑝
′). 
While an incompetent incumbent solves: 
(5) max
𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝐸𝑟𝑛𝑐 
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 where 
𝐸𝑟𝑛𝑐 = 𝜋𝑛𝑐(𝑝(1 − 𝑦) + 𝑦𝑟
𝑎) + (1 − 𝜋𝑛𝑐)(1 − 𝑝). 
We now present an auxiliary lemma regrading pel. 
Lemma 1 If S is not revealed, 
                 pel>p, if πc(p') is non decreasing in p' and there exists ?̂? ∈ [0,1) such that    
πc(p’) > πc(?̂?) for all p’>?̂?. 
               pel<p, if πc(p') is non increasing in p' and there exists ?̂? ∈ (0,1] such that 
πc(p’)> πc(?̂?) for all p’<?̂?. 
                   pel=p, if πc(p') is constant. 
Proof of Lemma 1: Given that S is not revealed after c=a, by Bayes' rule: 
(6) 𝑝𝑒𝑙 =
𝑞 ∫ 𝑓(𝑝′
1
𝑝′=0
)𝑝′𝜋𝑐(𝑝
′)𝑑𝑝′ + (1 − 𝑞)𝑝𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝑞 ∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)𝜋𝑐
1
𝑝′=0
(𝑝′)𝑑𝑝′ + (1 − 𝑞)𝜋𝑛𝑐
 
=
𝑞 ∫ 𝑓(𝑝′
1
𝑝′=0 )𝑝′𝜋𝑐(𝑝
′)𝑑𝑝′+(1−𝑞)𝑝𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝑞𝐸[𝜋𝑐]+(1−𝑞)𝜋𝑛𝑐
. 
Therefore, 
 𝑝𝑒𝑙
>
<
𝑝 
↔ 
∫ 𝑓(𝑝′
1
𝑝′=0
)𝑝′𝜋𝑐(𝑝
′)𝑑𝑝′
>
<
𝑝𝐸[𝜋𝑐] 
↔ 
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𝐸[𝑝′𝜋𝑐] − (𝐸𝑝′)𝐸[𝜋𝑐]
>
<
0 
↔ 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑝′, 𝜋𝑐(𝑝
′))
>
<
0. 
The result in Lemma 1 follows by the definition of covariance of two random 
variables. QED 
Note that by Lemma 1, sign(pel-p) when S is not revealed and therefore also ra is 
independent of πnc, which also implies that (4) is independent in πnc. Therefore, 
we first find the πc that solves (4), which is independent of πnc. Then we 
substitute this πc into (5) and find the πnc that solves (5). 
Assume that πc(p') is such that pel>p when S is not revealed and therefore 
ra=1 when S is not revealed. Then 𝐸{𝑟𝑐|𝑝
′} is a convex combination of the two 
constants: p'(1-y)+y and 1-p', and, therefore, is maximized when all the weight 
is allocated to the larger term, which implies that πc=0 (πc=1) when (p'<(1-y)/(2-
y)) (p'>(1-y)/(2-y)). And πcϵ[0,1] when p'=(1-y)/(2-y). By Lemma 1 and (2), ra=1 
when πc(p') follows this rule and S is not revealed.  
Note that if a competent incumbent  chooses a different strategy 
(namely, a different, πc(p')) that results in ra<1, then 𝐸{𝑟𝑐|𝑝
′} strictly decreases 
for all p'>(1-y)/(2-y) (since of the two terms in (4), the larger one decreases) and 
does not increase for all  p'≤(1-y)/(2-y) (since of the two terms in (4), the larger 
one does not change). Therefore, the strategy of a competent incumbent, πc(p'), 
is uniquely determined by the above rule. 
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 Substituting ra=1 in (5) gives  𝐸𝑟𝑛𝑐 = 𝜋𝑛𝑐(𝑝(1 − 𝑦) + 𝑦) + (1 − 𝜋𝑛𝑐)(1 −
𝑝), which implies that the optimal strategy of an incompetent incumbent  is 
πnc=0 (πnc=1) when p<(1-y)/(2-y) (p>(1-y)/(2-y)). And πncϵ[0,1] when p=(1-y)/(2-
y). QED 
Proof of Proposition 2: We first present an auxiliary lemma, which reduces the 
possible equilibria strategies to two, and then proceed to prove the proposition. 
Note that below we use notations defined in the beginning of the proof of 
Proposition 1. 
Lemma 2 If the voter is forward looking, then in a Bayesian equilibrium, either 
(πc,πnc)=(0,0) for all p' or (πc,πnc)=(1,1) for all p'. 
Proof: Note that in equilibrium, πncϵ{0,1}. This can be proved by contradiction. 
Assume that πncϵ(0,1). This is only possible if qc=q for all c(ϵ{a,na}); otherwise 
either qa<q which implies that ra(= {𝑟𝑓𝑙|𝑐 = 𝑎})=0 and therefore the incumbent  
will deviate to πnc=0, or qna<q which implies that rna(= {𝑟𝑓𝑙|𝑐 = 𝑛𝑎})=0 and 
therefore the incumbent  will deviates to πnc=1.9 Now, assume that, πncϵ(0,1) and 
that qc=q for all c. By (5), an incompetent incumbent 's best response is to choose 
πnc=0 (πnc=1) when 𝑝(1 − 𝑦) + 𝑦𝑟𝑎 < 1 − 𝑝  (𝑝(1 − 𝑦) + 𝑦𝑟𝑎 > 1 − 𝑝), a 
contradiction. 
In equilibrium if πnc=0 (πnc=1), then πc(p')=0 (πc(p')=1) for all p'. This, 
again, can be shown by contradiction. Assume that the strategy profile is: 
(πc(p'),πnc)=(πc(p'),k), where kϵ{0,1} and there exists p'ϵ[0,1] for which πc(p')≠k. 
 
9 Note that it is impossible that qc<q for all c or qc>q for all c, since then qa+qna≠q.  
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Then, qc<q for the specific c that is chosen by the incompetent incumbent and 
therefore the competent incumbent will never choose this specific c, a 
contradiction. QED 
The above implies that, a Bayesian equilibrium is therefore a pair: 
(π,µ(qc)), where π(ϵ{0,1}) is the incumbent 's strategy and µ(qc) is the voter's 
beliefs over qc for the particular c not chosen by the incumbent  (i.e., c=a when 
π=0 and c=na when π=1). Let µ(qa)<q. If π=0, then: Ernc>0 for all p, 𝐸{𝑟𝑐|𝑝
′} > 0 
for all p’≠1, and 𝐸{𝑟𝑐|𝑝
′} = 0 at p’=1. Instead, if π=1, then Ernc=𝐸{𝑟𝑐|𝑝
′} = 0.10 
Therefore, given that µ(qa)<q, π=0. Similarly, if µ(qna)<q, then π=1.11 
Note that there are no equilibria other than the above. This can be shown 
by contradiction. Suppose that π=1 and µ(qna)=q. Since y≤1, by (4) at p'=0 
𝑝′(1 − 𝑦) + 𝑦𝑟𝑎 < 1 − 𝑝′ (recall that by Lemma 2 and (1), ra=½), and, therefore, 
the competent incumbent  deviates to πc(0)≠1, a contradiction.  
Now suppose that π=0 and µ(qa)=q. Then, by (4), 𝐸{𝑟𝑐|1} = 0. However, 
if the competent incumbent deviates to πc(1)=1, then, by Lemma 1, ra=1 and 
therefore, by (4), 𝐸{𝑟𝑐|1} = 1, a contradiction.  QED 
 
10 Note that at p’=1 the competent incumbent is therefore indifferent between a and na. But 
choosing a only at p’=1 violates Lemma 2. 
11  To verify that the pair: (0,µ(qa)), where µ(qa)<q, is rational consistent,  we need to check that, 
by Bayes' rule, qa<q when a is chosen with a small probability (instead of zero). Specifically, let 
𝜋𝜀 = (1 − 𝑞)𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝜀 + 𝑞 ∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)𝜋𝑐
𝜀(𝑝′)𝑑𝑝′
1
𝑝′=0
= 𝜀, where ε is a small positive number. Then, by 
Bayes' rule,  𝑞𝑎 =
𝑞 ∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)𝜋𝑐
𝜀(𝑝′)𝑑𝑝′
1
𝑝′=0
𝜀
, which implies that, 𝑞𝑎 < 𝑞 ↔ 𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝜀 > ∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)𝜋𝑐
𝜀(𝑝′)𝑑𝑝′
1
𝑝′=0
. 
Therefore, (0,µ(qa)) such that µ(qa)<q, is rational consistent given the inequality above. Note that 
for any 𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝜀  and 𝜋𝑐
𝜀(𝑝′) that satisfies this inequality, 𝜋𝑛𝑐
𝜀 → 0, and 𝜋𝑐
𝜀(𝑝′) → 0 for all p', as ε→0. 
Similarly this can be verified for the pair: (1,µ(qna)), where µ(qna)<q.  
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Proof of Proposition 3: If p≤
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
, then: 
∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)𝑝′
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑝′=0
𝑑𝑝′ +∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)𝑝
1
𝑝′=
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑑𝑝′ 
< ∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)𝑝′
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑝′=0
𝑑𝑝′ +∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)
1
𝑝′=
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑝′𝑑𝑝′ 
= 𝑝. 
If 𝑝 >
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
, then: 
∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)𝑝′
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑝′=0
𝑑𝑝′ +∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)𝑝
1
𝑝′=
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑑𝑝′ < 𝑝 
↔ 
∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)𝑝′
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑝′=0
𝑑𝑝′ < 𝑝∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑝′=0
𝑑𝑝′ 
↔ 
∫
𝑓(𝑝′)
∫ 𝑓(𝑝′)
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑝′=0
𝑑𝑝′
𝑝′
1−𝑦
2−𝑦
𝑝′=0
𝑑𝑝′ < 𝑝. QED 
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider a backward looking voter. By Lemma 1, the 
strategies played in Proposition 1 ensures that pel>p when S is not revealed and 
therefore rbl=1 when S is not revealed and p≤p. Given that rbl=1 when S is not 
revealed, by the proof of Proposition 1, these strategies are optimal.  
Consider a forward looking voter. His equilibrium behavior is given by 
Proposition 2, since the proof of Proposition 2 apply regardless of whether p
>
<
𝑝. 
QED 
Appendix 2: Discussion of a backward looking voter for whom p>p:  
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In this case, equilibrium may or may not differ from the one characterized in 
Proposition 1. To see this, suppose that p>p and the incumbent plays the 
strategy in Proposition 1. If pel>p when S is not revealed, then the same 
reasoning used in the proof of Proposition 4 establishes the equilibrium of 
proposition 1 as an equilibrium for this case as well. If pel<p when S is not 
revealed, then ra=0. If ra=0, then by (4) and (5), the optimal strategy of the 
incumbent is to use the threshold 1/(2-y) (instead of the threshold (1-y)/(2-y) 
in Proposition 1). This threshold strategy is then an equilibrium iff it remains 
true that pa<p, which depends on the parameter p and on the probability 
distribution f(p’) (see (6)).  
As in the case of a pro-action voter, for either one of the equilibria above, 
comparing welfare is not possible without further assumptions. 
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